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3. What is Europe? 
Place, Idea, Action
Paul Stock
What is Europe? Nearly two-and-a-half-thousand years ago, the an-
cient Greek historian Herodotus (c.484–c.425 BCE) pondered precisely 
this question, remarking on the elusive meaning of the term. ‘As for 
Europe,’ he wrote, ‘no men have any knowledge whether it is bounded 
by seas or not, or where it got its name, nor is it clear who gave the 
name.’ Herodotus adds that the term might have derived from Eu-
ropa, a mythological Phoenician princess, though he glosses over this 
theory as vague and poorly-evidenced – a surprising conclusion given 
his notorious predilection for fanciful or exaggerated accounts. Today, 
the same core issue – what is Europe? – has lost none of its immediacy. 
In fact, related questions are among the most urgent in contemporary 
politics: what does ‘Europe’ mean, and to whom; where are its borders; 
who is European and who is not; what is Europe’s future? Importantly, 
these are also historical enquiries: if we are to understand the trajec-
tory of contemporary discussions about Europe, we need to analyse 
the histories of those debates as well as the concepts which underpin 
them. Here I want briefly to consider Europe as a place, as an idea, 
and, crucially, as a set of actions. In common usage the word typically 
refers to a continent, but it would be a mistake to assume that it refers 
strictly to a material location. Instead, we need to think of ‘Europe’ as an 
idea: a set of changing and historically-specific beliefs which shape our 
understanding of places and peoples. But neither is it enough to reduce 
‘Europe’ to an abstraction: ideas about Europe have concrete effects 
as individuals and other social actors justify their activities and policies 
in terms of those ideas.
For many people, the question ‘what is Europe?’ has an obvious 
answer: it is a continent, specifically the western part of the Eurasian 
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land mass. ‘Europe’, in other words, is a place: a demarcated area of 
the Earth’s surface. It is therefore a real, material entity detectable by 
the senses: one can live within Europe’s boundaries, stand on its soil; 
or leave it for another separate place such as Africa or America. But it 
would be a misleading to assume that ‘Europe’ is an objective product 
of the Earth’s physical features. This can be appreciated if we consider 
the continuous historical debates about Europe’s geographical extent.
As Herodotus’s remarks illustrate, the dimensions of Europe were 
unclear even to the earliest users of the term. In some classical texts it 
seems to have referred only to the coastal mainland distinct from the 
Greek islands and the Peloponnese, while in others Europe and Libya 
were conflated as the same large land mass. Similar problems have 
continued right through the modern period and into the present day, 
often focused on the placement of Europe’s eastern boundary at the 
point it meets Asia. Early modern cartographers proposed a bewilder-
ing variety of potential borders. For example, the French geographer 
Nicholas Sanson (1600–67) suggested a line connecting the White Sea 
to the River Dnieper in modern-day Ukraine, thus making Moscow a city 
in Asia. At the other extreme, the Dutch map-maker Gerard Valck 
(1652–1726) traced the Europe-Asia boundary from the River Ob in 
Siberia to the Caspian Sea.
By the later 18th century, one particular border had become especially 
widely reproduced, though it owed its success to a specific ideological 
agenda, and not simply to the dispassionate observation of natural truths. 
Beginning with the Ural mountains near the Arctic Circle, this bound-
ary followed the lines of the Rivers Volga and Don southwards before 
terminating in the Black Sea. Proponents of this line often justified it on 
the grounds of ancient precedent: according to both Strabo (c.64 BCE–
c.24 CE) and Ptolemy (c.100–170 CE) the River Don or Tanais marked 
the eastern limit of Europe. But in fact its popularity emerged from very 
specific political circumstances. The Urals-Don border was championed 
by Philip Johann von Strahlenberg (1676–1747), a Swedish military officer 
held prisoner by Peter the Great of Russia (1672–1725) and forced to 
undertake cartographic work for the Russian state. Strahlenberg argued 
that other proposed boundaries were ‘fictitious’ and that these moun-
tains and rivers formed an unmistakable dividing line. Significantly, his 
argument placed Russia securely in Europe, and it therefore cohered fully 
with Peter’s wider political and cultural agenda to promote his country as 
an unambiguously European state. The demarcation of European space 
is therefore directed by ideological priorities rather than by observation 
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of the natural environment. One might even argue that socio-political 
purposes can structure how the terrain is perceived and interpreted.
Another perennial problem concerns Europe’s south-eastern border: 
specifically, whether the Ottoman Empire (and later Turkey) is part 
of Europe. Certainly there is a long tradition, traceable from at least 
the medieval period, which views Turks as alien invaders and thus as 
non-Europeans. For instance, the future Pope Pius II (1405–64) ful-
minated against Muslim incursions westwards: ‘now that the city of 
Constantinople has fallen and been transferred into enemy hands […] 
now truly we have been stricken and felled in Europe, that is to say in 
our own fatherland, in our own house, in our seat’. But the presence of 
Greece within the Ottoman Empire complicated the situation, especially 
for the majority of post-Renaissance thinkers who considered classical 
civilisation fundamental to European history and culture. Greece and the 
Ottoman Empire were thus seen as simultaneously within and outside 
of Europe, and the precise location of any boundary is obscured by 
competing interpretations of history and identity.
Given the practical challenge of locating Europe and its borders, it is not 
surprising that one early 19th century mass-market reference book de-
fined ‘Europe’ as ‘the name given to one of the four great divisions into 
which geographers have divided the world’. ‘Europe’, in other words, is 
not a natural feature of the Earth; it is a concept invented and imposed 
by geographers. This suggests that a different approach is required: per-
haps we need to think of Europe not as a physical place, but rather as an 
idea. According to this approach, ‘Europe’ is a set of beliefs or principles 
which can be used to interpret the world and to define spaces and 
peoples. By investigating the idea of ‘Europe’ we are not searching for 
its essential meaning – a conclusive explanation of what it ‘is’. Instead, 
as Peter Rietbergen argues in his recent history of the continent, we are 
thinking of Europe as ‘a series of world-views, of peoples’ perspectives 
on their reality, sometimes only dreamt or desired, sometimes experi-
ences and realised’. Such ideas about Europe are always historical in the 
sense that they emerge at specific moments and according to particular 
ideological agendas, but they can also be long-lasting and reconceived 
in new contexts. We have already encountered the medieval idea that 
Europe and Christendom are commensurate, and that only Christians 
can be Europeans – an association which has continued to exert great 
influence despite the supposed secularisation of post-Enlightenment 
culture. Other familiar ideas from early modernity include the belief that 
Europe is the sole legitimate successor to the traditions of classical 
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Greece and Rome; that Europe is a region uniquely free from tyranny 
and thus the home of ‘liberty’; or that Europe is a uniquely ‘advanced’ 
culture which is destined to lead the world by influence or conquest.
In all of these cases, it would be a serious error to take these ideas 
at face value; to treat them as straightforward descriptions of fact, 
rather than as these interpretations of the world. The belief that Europe 
is a Christian continent, for example, ignores the presence of other 
faiths in European culture, Christianity’s global (not just continental) 
reach, and the long history of denominational conflict in the region. Just 
as we would recognise the racist and imperialist assumptions which 
underpin late 19th century notions of a European ‘master race’, so we 
must be similarly aware that all statements which purport to define or 
describe ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeans’ emerge from specific ideological 
and historical contexts. The historian’s task is to recognise that ‘Europe’ 
is a form of discourse: a way of organising, communicating and legiti-
mising ideas about people and space. Importantly too, the history of the 
idea of Europe encompasses ideas about European fragmentation and 
not just unity. After all, some of the most potent and enduring concepts 
of Europe are premised on firm distinctions between different nations 
or political systems, races or stages of societal ‘development’. The 
assumption that Europe is irretrievably disunited needs to be interro-
gated alongside claims of, or plans for, European unity.
It is not enough, however, to imply that Europe is merely an abstract 
concept to be analysed on a theoretical level. Ideas about Europe have 
material consequences because they inspire practical action. There are 
many examples throughout history of individuals, governments and 
other social actors using ideas about Europe to enact policy, to justify 
activity, or to delineate identities. Pope Urban II (c.1042–99) defined 
‘Europe’ as the ‘part of [the world that] we Christians live in’, and por-
trayed it as collectively humiliated by Muslim possession of the Holy 
Land. Urban’s speeches evoked and encouraged a trans-European 
culture and a Christian military alliance: they are now often seen as 
both a theoretical justification and a practical impetus for the First 
Crusade. Later, by the 17th century, politicians and political theorists 
in various Western European countries came to think of ‘Europe’ as 
a finely-balanced network of separate states, each with independent, 
though occasionally overlapping, interests. A key foreign policy objec-
tive based on this idea was to prevent a single state from achieving 
hegemonic power over the continent. Certainly, one can see this prin-
ciple behind British involvement in several 18th century conflicts, as 
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well as the agreed treaty settlements which followed them. The Con-
gress of Vienna which followed Napoleon’s defeat declined to weaken 
France unduly and thus create opportunities for a new hegemon in its 
place. Related ideas about European equilibrium continued to underpin 
British foreign policy into the later 19th and 20th centuries, especially 
as the consolidated German states altered the balance of power.
Today, different ideas about Europe sustain policy-making. In 2005, 
the Heads of State and Government at the Council of Europe set 
out a joint vision for ‘a united Europe, based on our common values 
and on shared interests’. Fundamental to this is the ‘core objective of 
preserving and promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law’, 
facilitated by a detailed action plan covering numerous practical issues 
from ensuring compliance with common legal standards to the joint 
promotion of sport. Likewise, the European Union has tried to re-cast 
and realise centuries-old ideas about ‘European liberty’ with its policies 
on the so-called ‘four freedoms’: the free movement of goods, people, 
services and capital across the states of the Union. By contrast, critics 
of the EU propose, and increasingly enact, alternative measures based 
on different conceptions of the idea of Europe. Eurosceptics often 
stress the irreconcilable independence of European nation-states, and 
advocate practical measures – like heightened migration controls – to 
achieve their distinct version of the ‘ideal’ Europe.
To sum up, ‘Europe’ is not a natural fact of geography. It does not 
possess essential and unchanging characteristics which can be discov-
ered if we look hard enough for empirical evidence of its true nature. 
Instead, ‘Europe’ is a concept fashioned by humans, established and 
reinvented according to historically-specific belief systems and ideologi-
cal principles. Crucially though, these ideas about Europe are also real, 
precisely because people believe that they are and because they act on 
those beliefs. Europe is always more than just an abstract idea: it has 
tangible applications and can structure our understanding of the real 
world. The task of the historian is to trace the emergence, trajectory and 
consequences of those ideas. This is a crucial responsibility given the 
continuing prevalence of ideas about Europe in contemporary societies, 
cultures and politics. We need historians to analyse and contextualise 
those notions, especially when they are used and abused for concrete 
ends. For those of us living inside the continent – as well as for a great 
many elsewhere – conceptions of Europe are everywhere, deeply 
woven in the histories we tell, in the identities we employ, and in the 
places we inhabit. This means that it is misleading and simplistic to 
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claim that we can either be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of Europe. Instead, the key ques-
tions for policymakers – and Europeans – are ‘what kind of Europe do 
we want to create?’ and ‘what kind of Europeans do we want to be?’
These questions were largely neglected in the recent referendum on 
the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU. The proffered options 
were poorly defined, and there was almost no attempt to evoke an idea 
of ‘Europe’ – within or outside of the EU – which could realise a clearly-
articulated social, cultural or economic vision. In the aftermath of the 
referendum, there needs to be more open debate about what ‘Europe’ 
means for us today, and the extent to which the EU in its present form 
can realise those ends. In arguing, as I have done, that Europe has no 
essential definitive qualities, it does not follow that it is both every-
thing and nothing and is thus an empty conceit. It means instead that 
‘Europe’ can be shaped to new purposes and that, in doing so, we are 
not obliged to equate existing conventions with the limits of our aspira-
tions. Do we want Europe to be a supra-national umbrella organisation, 
equipped with the trappings of nation-states on a grander scale? Do we 
want it to be the legal guarantor of distinctive and independent states, 
of commonly-agreed values, or both? Do we want ‘Europe’ to be an 
alternative form of identity to the nationalist rivalry so prevalent in the 
recent past? At this moment of reassessment for Britain and the EU, 
these discussions are now needed more than ever. What is Europe 
now? What can we make it? Who shall we be? These are the real ques-
tions for public intellectuals, policymakers and voters.
